Introduction
A striking feature of contemporary politics in East Central Europe (ECE) is the ongoing erosion of the consensus on the question of European integration. Shortly after the revolutions of 1989, the idea of 'Europe' became an allembracing concept, which united the political elites and the masses in their burning desire to join the European Union (EU). 'Return to Europe' was one of the main slogans in the early 1990s (see Pontes Resende and Tanasoiu, 2001) . At that time, it was difficult to find a political party or movement that would seriously consider alternatives to joining the EU in its existing form; the mass public was overwhelmingly positive too. Now, more than a decade after the transitions, and shortly before the possible accession to the EU of the ECE countries, the picture appears to be radically different. Debates between and within parties are getting more intense, and criticism of the EU is growing. Moreover, as various public opinion polls indicate, mass support for EU membership has been declining as well (see Grabbe and Hughes, 1999) . Although the previous, and to some extent romantic and illusory, consensus concerning Europe has evaporated, a new one has yet to be formed.
However, opposition to the EU within the ECE countries is manifested differently both in public opinion and by political elites. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics provide such contrasting experiences. For example, Slovakia, which encountered serious difficulties in its path toward EU membership, combines a relatively low level of consensus among the political elite on the question of EU enlargement with a relatively high level of positive consensus at the mass level. Hungary and the Czech Republic, which are certain to be among the first ECE countries to join the EU, are showing signs of ambiguous elite approaches towards the political, economic, and security structures of the EU, and, in the Czech Republic, a comparatively high negative image of the EU at the mass level. Poland, also in the group of front-runners, displays relatively high levels of both positive elite consensus and mass public support for the EU. Moreover, within these countries, there are parties as well as party factions that are hostile to European integration.
But how exactly is the opposition to Europe to be understood, and how relevant is it in the domestic political structures of the ECE countries? Are the terms commonly used to categorize opposition to European integration, such as 'Eurosceptic' or 'Eurorealist', useful in general, and in ECE in particular? Indeed, is Euroscepticism really gaining ground in East Central Europe? This article attempts to answer these questions (a) by developing a conceptual scheme through which the opposition to Europe in general, and Euroscepticism in particular, can be studied, and (b) by exploring party-based attitudes towards European integration in the four countries of East Central Europethe Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. It will thus make a contribution to our understanding both of the variety of positions on European issues that political parties can take and of the strength of the opposition to Europe in the domestic political structures of the candidate ECE countries.
The article is divided into two main sections. In the first, we review existing definitions of Euroscepticism and draw attention to several problems that exist in the comparative research in this field. In particular, we critically examine the distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001a, 2001b; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2000) , and offer instead a two-dimensional conceptualization of party positions on Europe based on the distinction between 'diffuse' and 'specific' support for European integration. The second section analyses party positions on European integration in the four ECE countries. As a background, we first provide a short overview of the most recent aggregate data on public support for EU membership among the ECE electorates. This is followed by a qualitative analysis of party positions in each individual country, with a particular focus on the parties that express some form of opposition to European integration. In our concluding discussion, we first discuss the political relevance of scepticism about European integration in ECE, and, second, we argue on the basis of our ECE case studies that our two-dimensional concept clarifies both the content and the explanation of Euroscepticism more generally.
Defining Euroscepticism
Both academic studies and the popular political discourse concerning European integration have been plagued by a whole range of terms used to capture opposition to these processes. 'Euroscepticism' has been the most frequently used term in this respect, but alternative and complementary terms are commonplace as well. What is striking is not so much the fact that politicians often fight over where exactly they or their party belong ideologically, but the fact that these terms are presented with very little specification as to what they may actually mean. Therefore, any analysis of Euroscepticism must inevitably start with a precise definition of the term, and in particular its differentiation from other popular terms, such as 'Europhobia' or 'Europragmatism'.
Most of the current comparative literature on Euroscepticism has been using the influential definition initially proposed by Paul Taggart, who suggests that Euroscepticism is best studied as an encompassing term that 'expresses the idea of contingent, or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration ' (1998: 366) . In a later elaboration of his work, this broad definition has been refined with a specific reference to East Central Europe to include categories of 'soft' and 'hard' Euroscepticism: 'Hard Euroscepticism implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU' (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001a: 5) ; soft Euroscepticism, in contrast, is defined as involving 'contingent or qualified opposition to European integration' (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001a: 6) .
Although we acknowledge the improvement of the original definition, we still see four weaknesses in this elaboration. First, soft Euroscepticism is defined in such a broad manner that virtually every disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be included. Second, the relatively clear distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism is later blurred when the authors argue that 'in practice hard Euroscepticism can be identified by the principled objections to the current form of European integration in the EU' (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001a: 6) . Third, the criteria that are used both to connect and to separate the two forms of Euroscepticism remain unclear. Consequently, it is difficult to explain why different forms of Euroscepticism appear. Fourth, the categories 'soft' and 'hard' Euroscepticism do not do enough justice to the subtle, yet important, distinction between the ideas of European integration, on the one hand, and the European Union as the current embodiment of these ideas, on the other hand. 1 As a result, the term 'Euroscepticism' is, in our view wrongly, ascribed to parties and ideologies that are in essence pro-European as well as to those that are outright antiEuropean. In practice, this may result in the over-and underestimation of the strength of the phenomenon in any (party) political system and lead us to see either more or less Euroscepticism than there actually is.
We therefore propose an alternative way of categorizing opposition to Europe by defining the term Euroscepticism in relation to other (party) positions on 'Europe'. In our scheme, Euroscepticism is defined less inclusively, yet more precisely, than in the above-mentioned definitions. We draw on David Easton's seminal distinction between different forms of support for political regimes (Easton, 1965: 124ff.) by distinguishing between 'diffuse' and 'specific' support for European integration. 2 By diffuse support we mean support for the general ideas of European integration that underlie the EU. By specific support we denote support for the general practice of European integration; that is, the EU as it is and as it is developing.
These are the two dimensions through which support for European integration in general, and scepticism about European integration in particular, can be studied. The first dimension, 'support for the ideas of European integration', separates the Europhiles from the Europhobes. Europhiles believe in the key ideas of European integration underlying the EU: institutionalized cooperation on the basis of pooled sovereignty (the political element) and an integrated liberal market economy (the economic element). However, they believe in such ideas regardless of how European integration is defined and realized in detail. The Europhiles can thus include those who see European integration as a project of creating a new supranational state (e.g. federalists), but also those who see European integration exclusively in economic terms (e.g. the creation of a free trade zone). Jean Monnet's reflections on the process of European integration, written in the 1960s, represent a clear Europhile position. He believed in European integration for both political and economic reasons, with the former perhaps most important to his thinking. 3 But the former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher in our view also takes a Europhile stance. 4 Thatcher, of course, saw European integration primarily in economic terms, as the creation of an economic zone free of restrictions on trade and other commercial activity. In that, she differs from the position of the 'founding fathers of the EU', such as Monnet or Schuman. However, Thatcher accepted the underlying ideas of the EU -a certain degree of pooling of sovereignty towards European supranational institutions, in both political and economic terms. Her Europhile position was thus similar to that of the former French president Charles de Gaulle, who spoke of a united Europe as 'the dream of the wise' yet, at the same time, considered only minimal and voluntary cooperation between nation-states as the best way of European integration (De Gaulle, 1994) .
Europhobes do not support (and often even oppose) the general ideas of European integration underlying the EU. They take this position because they may be nationalists, socialists, or isolationalists, or simply because they believe the idea of European integration is a folly in the face of the diversity (and 'thus' incompatibility) existing among European states. On the face of it, this may appear only a minority position, certainly in contemporary Europe. For even the nationalists will often express some support for the idea of cooperation among European states. However, what matters here is that they fail to support one or more of the ideas underlying European integration.
For example, the declaration 'Building a New Europe', signed in 1999 by 13 West European extreme left parties, includes a call for a 'social and ecological Europe, a democratic Europe, a Europe of solidarity and of peace ' (SP, 2002) . Though this vision of an alternative Europe is supportive of cooperation between European countries, it is in fundamental opposition to the ideas underlying the current process of European integration, which are described by one of the parties, the Dutch Socialist Party (SP), as neo-liberal, antisocial, and undemocratic.
On the extreme right of the European political spectrum, several parties call for an altogether different Europe. The most clear Europhobic example is the Europa der Völker (Europe of Ethnic Communities), which entails cooperation between 'pure' European nation-states, of both the East and the West, but only on specific matters and without the loss of national sovereignty or identity (Mudde, 2000: 152-3) . Finally, there are isolationist parties, such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which technically do not oppose the current process of European integration, or the EU, but do not want to be a part of it.
The second dimension of our typology, 'support for the European Union', separates the EU-optimists from the EU-pessimists. EU-optimists believe in the EU as it is and as it is developing, either because they are satisfied with the way it has been set up and is running, or because they are optimistic about the direction of development of the EU (Batory, 2001) . It is important to emphasize that a critical attitude towards a certain EU policy does not in itself disqualify a party from being an EU-optimist. As soon as the party accepts the current EU overall, it is included in this category. For example, despite some criticism of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) is EU-optimist, not only because it sees the EU as a vital instrument for the support of farmers' communities (discussed later), but also because it supports the general shape and development of the EU's political, institutional, and social elements.
EU-pessimists, in contrast, do not support the EU as it is at the moment, or are pessimistic about the direction of its development. This does not necessarily mean that all EU-pessimists object to EU membership. Some simply consider the current EU to be a serious deviation from their interpretation of the founding ideas of European integration. However, because they do support these ideas, they hope to change the EU in such a way that it becomes a truer reflection of them.
These two dimensions lead to four ideal-type categories of party positions on Europe, graphically illustrated in Figure 1 . In the top left-hand corner are those we label Euroenthusiasts: parties or groups that combine Europhile and EU-optimist positions. Such groups support the general ideas of European integration and believe that the EU is or will soon become the institutionalization of these ideas. Eurosceptics, located in the bottom left-hand corner, combine Europhile and EU-pessimist positions. They support the general ideas of European integration, but are pessimistic about the EU's current and/or future reflection of these ideas. In the bottom right-hand corner we locate the Eurorejects, who combine Europhobe and EU-pessimist positions. They subscribe neither to the ideas underlying the process of European integration nor to the EU. Finally, the top right-hand corner contains those we label (for want of a better term) the Europragmatists. This group combines Europhobe and EU-optimist positions: they do not support the general ideas of European integration underlying the EU, nor do they necessarily oppose them, yet they do support the EU. In general, this group will contain parties that do not hold a firm ideological opinion on European integration, and on the basis of pragmatic (often utilitarian) considerations decide to assess the EU positively because they deem it profitable for their own country or constituency. The usefulness of the proposed typology will become apparent from the following qualitative analysis of party positions on European integration in ECE. We agree with Tiersky (2001b: 305) that '[t] o organize the matter of the subject, tags such as Euro-skepticism, Euro-optimism, Euro-pessimism, Europhobia, and Euro-enthusiasm are serviceable, so long as we remember that labels are a beginning, not the end of the discussion.' Indeed, if anything, we believe that our conceptual scheme offers a good analytical tool for understanding the goals and strategies of political elites opposing Europe.
Let 
Party positions on European integration in East Central Europe
As among the existing EU members, the debate concerning EU integration and EU accession in ECE countries has been conducted mainly at the elite level. However, most of the ECE countries committed themselves to conducting referendums on EU membership. Gaining support (or mastering the opposition) will thus matter greatly for the accession process. Moreover, the public mood concerning prospective EU membership is an important backdrop to the evolving positions of the major ECE parties, 5 which we analyse in detail below.
Attitudes toward European integration at the mass level
In Hungary, popular support for accession to the European Union is the strongest among our four countries: in May 2000, 69% of respondents indicated they would vote 'yes' if a referendum on the accession of the country to the EU was held now (13% would vote against, and 19% were undecided). 6 Comparable figures for Poland are 59%, 25% and 16%, and for the Czech Republic 49%, 25% and 26%. In Slovakia, 72% of respondents supported EU membership in August 2000 , with 19% against it (CEORG, 2000 . Moreover, although there has been some oscillation in public support in each individual country, all countries are showing a declining trend in support. For example, according to a May 2001 GfK poll, the number of respondents in favour of accession has fallen to a record low of 42% in the Czech Republic, and in Poland too the figure fell below the important 50% level (44%). Only in Hungary does a majority still support EU membership (54%). Unfortunately, the poll excluded Slovakia. 7 The Hungarians remain the strongest supporters of accession, and the Czechs appear the most reluctant, with the Poles and the Slovaks somewhere in between. Moreover, the Hungarians not only declare the strongest support for European integration, but also evaluate relations between their country and the EU most favourably. In June 2000, the largest percentage of Hungarians (38%) described these relations as equally beneficial for their country and the EU, and almost one in four (24%) thought that Hungary benefited most from these relations. In contrast, 50% of Poles think that the EU benefits most from these relations (with 26% believing both Poland and the EU benefit equally, and only 6% believing Poland benefits most). The Czechs appear slightly more positive than the Poles, though not as much as the Hungarians: 27% think the relations are equally beneficial, 34% that they are most beneficial for the EU, and 16% that they are most beneficial for the Czech Republic (CEORG, 2000) . Comparable data on Slovakia were not available to us.
The Czech Republic
The Czech Republic has gradually acquired the popular status of the most Eurosceptic ECE country. The presented data on public support for the EU go some way to uphold this view, as do the debates conducted at the elite level. For example, a study of the views of Czech local politicians on European integration, based on interviews conducted in 1997, notes that Czech local politicians have little knowledge of and interest in the EU. Indeed, most consider the EU a 'necessary evil' (Perron, 2000: 22) . Resentment is mainly the consequence of a feeling of being treated as an unequal partner, fear of a loss of national sovereignty (linked to the Soviet experience), and, among right-wing parties, the alleged 'socialism' of the Brussels bureaucracy (the last issue is the only substantial point of difference between right-wing and leftwing local politicians).
There are four main Euroenthusiast parties in the Czech Republic. The Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party (KDU-ČSL), the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), and the Freedom Union (US) are all firmly proEuropean integration and pro-EU, and so are the majority of their voters (see Mastalir, 1999; Mares, 2000) . The Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) is also an outspoken Euroenthusiast party. It supports the ideas of the Socialist International and sees the EU as a venue for the advancement of the modern social democratic project, i.e. a federalist Europe with a social market economy. Indeed, soon after ČSSD formed the government following the 1998 elections, it formulated and carried out an extensive programme of reforms and legislative acts to speed up the full adjustment of the Czech Republic in anticipation of the 2003-4 entry date.
The largest right-of-centre party, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), is the most outspoken Eurosceptic party in the Czech Republic. Its leader, Václav Klaus, has for long been known as the most vocal critic of EU-related matters in the country. The ODS's Euroscepticism has two elements. On the one hand, the ODS displays a strong pro-European orientation in a cultural sense, in that it considers the Czech Republic to belong to the sphere of West European values. Moreover, the ODS and its leader have been consistently in favour of the Czech Republic joining the EU and they accept a certain loss of national sovereignty resulting from the process of accession. Indeed, it was during the ODS coalition government that the Czech Republic officially applied for EU membership, in January 1996.
On the other hand, the ODS sees the project of European integration primarily as a means to enlarge markets and to further deepen economic cooperation. Therefore, the party is deeply unimpressed by the more recent direction of the EU. It has criticized many aspects of the current EU from standpoints similar to those of like-minded parties in Western Europe, most notably the British Conservative Party. The EU bureaucracy, perceived as vast and unaccountable, is at the centre of its critique. Other bones of contention are the allegedly excessive EU regulations and overly generous social dimension of EU policies. Enhanced political integration is not welcomed by the ODS either. The party often states that the Czech Republic is a sovereign state, with deep social, political, and cultural roots, which should not become dissolved in a superstate structure (see Klaus, 1997) .
Until its bankruptcy in 2000, the extreme right Association for the Republic -Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ) was the clearest example of a Euroreject party in the Czech Republic. Owing to their nationalist and fiercely anti-German stands, the 'Republicans' rejected the founding ideas of European integration, and were clearly anti-EU. When the party was in parliament (in 1992-8) , its critique of the EU focused mainly on the alleged sell-outs of Czech industry and property to Western (read, German) companies. It claimed that the sell-outs were embraced by the 'traitorous' Czech elite and by the EU's integration policies, and that they were designed to reinforce the domination of the Czech Republic by the interests of 'multinational capital'.
Since 1998, the pariah KSČM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) has become the sole flag-bearer of the Euroreject cause in the Czech parliament. However, the party is somewhat difficult to classify because it hovers between a Euroreject and a Europragmatic position. Whereas the Communists supported Czechoslovak EU membership shortly after the regime change in 1989 (but always opposed NATO), the party has moved over time to a far more critical position. The material published on the party website (www.kscm.cz) suggests not only that the KSČM is currently highly ambiguous about EU membership, but also that its criticism of European integration bears all the hallmarks of a Euroreject party. The Communists associate the process of European integration with exploitative multinational capitalism. The accession process itself is seen as dominated by, and protective of German economic interests in particular. Thus, the KSČM rejects both the economic and political foundations underlying European integration and the EU itself, putting it in the group of Euroreject parties.
That said, the party has not categorically ruled out EU membership. This may stem from a schism in the Communists' feelings towards European integration -whether to see it as a (positive) realization of internationalism, or as a (negative) product of imperialism (Mareš, 2000) . Most importantly, it derives from the division that exists between the party leadership and the party membership. Whereas many leaders are keen to accept EU membership (a Europragmatic position), mainly in order to gain broader acceptance within the domestic and international political establishment, the members appear much truer to the party's declared ideological opposition and thus adopt a Euroreject stance.
Hungary
Although Hungary has the most Europhile population and is generally considered to be the main front-runner of the four ECE countries discussed here, the issue of European integration is not particularly salient in the Hungarian public debate (see Hegedus, 1999; Navracsics, 1997) . Moreover, the Hungarian elite has become less Europhile over the years and, in particular, the last government had a somewhat strained relationship with the EU. In recent years, this has been best exemplified by the criticism of the lack of speed of the EU accession process by the prime minister, Victor Orbán, and the agitated reactions of EU officials. In addition, some key Hungarian parties are moderately, and some even extremely, critical both of the process of European integration and of the EU.
The two parties constituting the previous government, under Prime Minister Gyula Horn, are the most outspoken Euroenthusiasts in Hungary.
The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the reformed communist successor party, has joined and accepted the ideals of the Socialist International, i.e. a supranationalist or federalist Europe concentrating on socioeconomic and welfare issues (Navracsics, 1997) . The Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), a member of the Liberal International and the European Liberal Democrats, is probably the most Euroenthusiast party in Hungary. Supportive primarily of the market economy and the human rights it associates with the EU, the party considers EU membership to be its key objective.
The last centre-right government held a fairly ambiguous position on the process of European integration in general, and the EU in particular. The ambiguity has partly to do with suspicions towards the whole process, and partly with clashes between perceived Hungarian and EU interests. This is most notable in the case of the 'Hungarians abroad', that is, the Hungarianspeaking minorities in the countries bordering Hungary, for whom the Hungarian state holds a constitutional responsibility. However, whereas this issue has become a real dilemma for the extreme nationalists, such as the MIÉP (discussed later), the moderate nationalists within the Hungarian government tried to use the process of European integration to help accomplish their nationalist goals (see Csergo and Goldgeier, 2001) .
Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz-MPP) was the senior partner in the last government. It started out as a young, liberal, anti-communist (student) movement. During its early days, Fidesz was a Euroenthusiast party, seeing the EU primarily as an economic community that proved the superiority of Western values over Eastern ones. Since then, it has moved toward a more conservative position, changing from the Alliance of Young Democrats into the Hungarian Civic Party, which also influenced its position on European integration. Most importantly, the party has changed its mainly technocratic approach to European integration to one increasingly focused on the social and cultural aspects of the process of Europeanization (Navracsics, 1997) .
In recent years, Fidesz-MPP in general, and Prime Minister Orbán in particular, have featured in various accounts on Euroscepticism in East Central Europe, often lumped together with the Czech former prime minister, Václav Klaus (e.g. Green, 2000) . However, there is one fundamental difference between the two conservative-liberal leaders. Whereas Klaus indeed criticizes the fundamentals of the EU, at times openly doubting whether EU accession is still the best way forward for his country, Orbán is mainly disappointed about the slowness of the accession process, calling upon the EU to admit Hungary as soon as possible (see Hegedus, 1999) . The key similarity between Klaus and Orbán is that they are the only high-profile ECE politicians who have dared to criticize aspects and actions of the EU (and have been castigated by the EU in return). What separates them is that Klaus (ODS) has become Eurosceptic, whereas Orbán (Fidesz-MPP) remains Euroenthusiast.
The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) was the major party in the first post-communist government, but has since degenerated from a broad anticommunist alliance into a minor conservative shadow of Fidesz-MPP. It supports both European integration and EU membership, subscribing to the sociocultural element of the Christian democratic vision of Europe. At the same time, the party is worried about the loss of national sovereignty. Unlike Fidesz-MPP, the MDF is increasingly concerned about Hungary's level of preparation for EU accession, fearing that in the event of a rapid accession Hungary would be defenceless within the Union. In addition, it struggles to reconcile its two foreign policy priorities: support for 'Hungarians abroad' and EU membership. The MDF nonetheless remains a Euroenthusiast party.
Officially a 'national-Christian peasant party' (Batory, 2001: 12) , the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP) is one of the most difficult parties to classify. This is partly because of the various internal struggles this two-times junior coalition partner is still going through, and partly because of the erratic nature of its leader, József Torgyán. Despite the party's official pro-European stance, it cannot really be called a Europhile party. With its prime loyalty to 'God, Fatherland, [and] Family', as the party motto reads, the FKGP does not support the general ideas underlying the process of European integration. It sees political integration as a threat to Hungary's national interests, while economic integration is deemed threatening to its constituency (the rural population), particularly through the despised issue of land ownership (crucial to EU accession). That said, the FKGP has generally taken a positive stand on EU membership, and its ministers of agriculture faithfully implemented EU legislation. This pro-EU stand was the result both of external pressure (from its major coalition partner, Fidesz-MPP) and of a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis of EU membership, which led the party to expect a 'substantial and positive balance of payments with the Union' (in Batory, 2001: 13) . Consequently, the FKGP has, for the most part, taken a Europragmatic position.
The last party in the conservative bloc is the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), which was a junior partner in the first post-communist government (1990-4), but has since lost support and even parliamentary representation. Although the KDNP has gone through various ideological phases, which included changes to its rhetoric on the EU, the party remains essentially Europhile. However, the party has become more EU-pessimistic since losing parliamentary representation in 1998, despite its EU-optimism in government and, to a large extent, also in opposition. Although it still supports EU membership, it has become Eurosceptic, deeply concerned about the potential loss of sovereignty. As its leader declared, '[i]n the Christian democratic politics, the homeland has priority over the European Union' (quoted in Navracsics, 1997: 15) .
The extreme right Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIÉP), led by István Csurka, is fully in line with its 'brethren' in the West in terms of its position on European integration (see Mudde, 2000) . It claims to be proEuropean and therefore anti-EU! The MIÉP opposes both the political and the economic ideals underlying the process of European integration on the basis of its nationalist and anti-Semitic ideas. The most interesting aspect of the MIÉP's nationalism is its support for a 'Third Way', rooted in Hungary's national-populist tradition, 'arguing that Hungary must not follow either Western or Eastern patterns, but that a Hungarian model of social and economic development must be found' (Navracsics, 1997: 14) . In this vision, European integration, like all forms of globalization, is seen as a threat to the Hungarian nation and as a conspiracy by 'cosmopolitan' (read, Jewish) forces to weaken the European nations (see Csurka, 2000) . It is therefore not surprising that the party is highly sceptical about EU membership, arguing that both the political-cultural and the economic costs for the Hungarian nation are too high.
What is remarkable, however, is that the MIÉP does not categorically rule out EU membership, but rather proposes 'to postpone a final decision to the distant future and return to the question of EU membership from a strengthened position' (Batory, 2000: 32) . This can best be explained by the dilemma of the EU versus Greater Hungary that Hungarian nationalists face. However, whereas the more moderate nationalists are trying to use the EU for their nationalist goals (see Csergo and Goldgeier, 2001) , the MIÉP sees the EU as prima facie anti-Hungarian. Yet, to prevent the EU from dividing the Hungarian nation, and accepting that it cannot do much about the aspirations to join the EU of the countries with a Hungarian-speaking minority, the MIÉP is trying to keep the whole 'Hungarian nation' outside the EU until it can join as a whole. Thereby, it hovers between a sincere Euroreject position and a strategic Europragmatic policy.
Poland
Poland, the largest of the four prospective EU members from ECE, has had the strongest elite consensus on EU membership in the ECE context, combined with the most critical (though not necessarily outright negative) and worried electorate. Yet, in recent times, various kinds of 'Eurosceptic' parties and factions have appeared on the Polish scene. At the moment, almost all the major political parties make a point about defending Polish interests in the accession process, though, as we shall see, this is sometimes more a matter of strategy than of ideological persuasion.
The Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) is the organizationally restructured and ideologically changed successor to the former ruling communist party. It entered government for the first time in the post-communist period in 1993, and its leader, Aleksander Kwašniewski, was elected president of Poland in 1995 and convincingly re-elected in 2000. The SLD is essentially a Euroenthusiast and modern social democratic party. Its attitudes toward the EU are the same as those of other current mainstream social democrats in Europe (for example, the British Labour Party or the ČSSD). The SLD shares the Polish Euroenthusiast arena with the Freedom Union (UW), a secular and liberal party (home of Balczerowicz) that lost parliamentary representation in 2001, and with the Civic Platform (PO), a new right-of-centre party that first entered parliament that year.
The Polish Peasant Party (PSL), successor to a satellite party under communism, has a strong rural constituency containing both small private farmers and some big capitalist farmers. Given the structure of Polish agriculture and the problems it is facing while negotiating EU entry, it is not surprising that the PSL has one of the most Eurosceptic electorates, especially among the smallholding peasants (see Szczerbiak, 2001b) . In its propaganda, the party also claims to adopt a hard stance in negotiations with the EU, protecting the Polish national (read, agricultural) interests. However, this mainly reflects the perceived threat from its more radical competitors, such as Samoobrona (discussed later). The PSL elite believes both in the ideas underlying European integration and in the EU (because of its support for farmers), and is thus a Euroenthusiast party. According to the party, Poland should get the best possible deal within the EU.
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) was established in 1996 as an attempt to reunite the Polish Right. It was a very diverse electoral coalition rather than a party in the traditional sense. The AWS won the 1997 parliamentary elections and formed a government with the UW. Officially Euroenthusiast, the AWS is very pro-clerical and has strong links to the Catholic Church. Until 1997, the party was very ambiguous about Europe, combining a commitment to European unity and Western civilization with strong doubts about the consumerism, secular liberalism, and permissive societies of Western Europe. After 1997, the Church (i.e. the episcopate) shifted its position, unexpectedly embracing European integration (Millard, 1999) . This notwithstanding, there have been various Euroreject and Eurosceptic factions within the original AWS, 8 and also within its successor, the AWSP (Solidarity Election Action Right), which did not gain parliamentary representation in the 2001 elections.
Peace and Justice (PiS) is a new conservative cadre party, which was founded shortly before the 2001 parliamentary elections in opposition to both the SLD and the AWS. It successfully contested the elections on an authoritarian and populist platform, including tough law and order measures and a critique of economic reforms and of European integration (Harvey-Smith, 2002) . In spite of this, the PiS is a moderately Europhile party. Its election programme states: 'The second most important direction of our foreign policy [after membership of NATO] is to try to get Poland into the European Union' (PiS, n.d.a). However, according to the PiS the EU should be based on strong, unitary nation-states, not unlike de Gaulle's famous dictum of a Europe de Patries. Consequently, it is EU-pessimist in word and deed, opposing the speedy accession route being taken by the current left-wing Polish government. In its political manifesto, the PiS insists that, before the final decision on EU membership is taken, the possible long-term consequences and costs of European integration have to be analysed. After that, '[t] he nation has to decide on the basis of its conscience' (PiS, n.d.b). In conclusion, the PiS is a Eurosceptic party, which currently is actually opposed to EU membership in the short term.
Another new parliamentary party is the League of Polish Families (LPR); its leaders originate from within the AWS, while its support comes from the orthodox Catholic subculture around the infamous Radio Maryja. The LPR is an extreme right party, with a pro-clerical, anti-reform, and anti-integration platform. In its election programme the party claims that it will denounce the accession treaty because it will cost Poland US$10 billion and some 1 million jobs (LPR, n.d.). In line with its anti-Semitic nationalism, the LPR describes the EU as 'speculative foreign capital' that will cause 'the destruction of Polish conscience and culture ' (LPR, n.d.) . Though the party does not express any view on the ideas of European integration as such, party programme statements such as the following clearly demonstrate its Euroreject position: 'They will succeed in melting our nation in a unified cosmopolitan European Union. This is the purpose of the so-called reforms of Sachs and Soros, realised through Balczerowicz, Bauc, and others, and supported by Kwašniewski, Michnik and the cosmopolitan media' (LPR, n.d.).
Self-Defence (Samoobrona), another successful parliamentary candidate in the 2001 elections, is both a political party and a trade union, led by the populist Andrzej Lepper (see Krok-Paszkowska, 2002) . Notorious for his radical actions in the defence of the interests of small farmers, including several violent and disruptive demonstrations, Lepper cannot be pinned down on a coherent ideology (similarly to Torgyán in Hungary). On the one hand, he often flirts with nationalism, including anti-German and anti-EU sentiments; he once described the EU as a 'new kolkhoz' (Strobel, 2001: 278) .
On the other hand, he is not against EU membership in principle. However, the party is extremely critical about the Polish position in negotiations, sensitive to the loss of national sovereignty and to the unequal position of Poland in a future Europe, and pessimistic about the possibility of sustaining the EU in its current form. In short, Lepper and Samoobrona are hovering between outright Eurorejectionism and a Europragmatism, with the former still clearly having the upper hand.
Slovakia
Slovakia has never been regarded as a Eurosceptic country, despite its exclusion from the EU accession talks before the fall of Mečiar's government in September 1998. In essence, Slovakia's route to EU membership had less to do with the views of Slovak parties and citizens than with the satisfaction of political conditions laid down by the EU for prospective member states. However, the mere fact that two governments led by the former prime minister, Vladimír Mečiar were willing to sacrifice the potential for successful negotiations on EU entry for considerations related to domestic political struggles (see Kopecký and Mudde, 2000) is a good starting point in mapping attitudes to European integration in Slovakia.
The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) has undoubtedly played a pivotal role in the difficult path towards EU membership since Slovakia's independence in 1993. Although the party has always supported EU membership, doubts about the party's pro-European stance were aroused by the behaviour of the HZDS-led government (1994-8), which was interpreted by the EU as proof of the party's isolationist stance. This was strengthened by the existence of an intra-party faction of fierce nationalists, who rejected the founding ideas of European integration in general, and the EU (accession) in particular, on the basis of its perceived threat to the new nationstate.
Since the HZDS passed from incumbency to opposition, it has tried hard to present a pro-European face. Indeed, the nationalist and anti-European wing within the party has been largely muted. The HZDS also adopted a critical stance towards its main former coalition partner, the SNS (discussed later), accusing the party of being xenophobic and anti-European. During its current campaign for European recognition, the HZDS sometimes ostensibly displays Euroenthusiasm. For example, Mečiar published a book in 2000 in which he claims to subscribe to a federal and rather centralized version of European integration. He further declares his support for a 'United States of Europe' with an elected central government and parliament.
In parliamentary debates, however, the HZDS (supported by the SNS) often plays an obstructive role in the process of adoption of the acquis communitaire. It opposes many legislative acts, labelling them as betraying Slovak interests and as geared towards the extinction of Slovak statehood. Indeed, the party's statement that a constitutional commitment to open the country toward the EU was 'a nightmare' led the current ruling coalition to accuse the HZDS of cynical insincerity in its proclaimed Europeanism. All in all, then, the HZDS is a Europragmatic rather than a Euroreject or Eurosceptic party. It has deep misgivings not only about the EU but also about the ideas underlying European integration. However, the leadership seeks international recognition (of both the party and the Slovak state) by strategically supporting EU membership. The extreme right Slovak National Party (SNS) is a Euroreject party, deeply distrustful of both the ideas underlying European integration and the EU itself. It favours a position of neutrality, which is particularly visible in the party's vehement opposition to NATO but also in its preference for the postponement of EU membership. However, while in government with the HZDS, the SNS's opposition to the official pro-European government programme was largely muted (Fried, 1997) . In opposition, the SNS no longer masks its Euroreject position and is asking for EU membership to be put on hold, at least temporarily. Following the near demise of its former coalition partner, the ZRS (discussed next), the SNS remains the only Euroreject party on the Slovak political scene. Although the party is now distancing itself from its previously declared 'spiritual alliance' with parties such as the French National Front (FN) or the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), it is trying to establish new links with other Western extreme and mainstream right-wing parties, such as the Italian National Alliance (AN), allied in the (Eurosceptic/Euroreject) Union for Europe of the Nations Group of the European Parliament.
The Slovak Workers' Association (ZRS) was an extreme left 'flash-in-thepan' party, which entered both parliament and government months after its creation in 1994 and disappeared into political oblivion after the unsuccessful 1998 elections. As part of the 1994-8 Mečiar government, it did not question the official pro-European and pro-integrationist orientation. Yet it was essentially a Euroreject party, being deeply critical of the process of European integration in general, and of the process of EU accession in particular. For example, when in 1996 a Slovak journalist managed to obtain an original (never published) typewritten draft of the party programme, which included full support for the EU and NATO, party leader Ján Lupták publicly declared this passage of the document to be a typing error! During the 1998 electoral campaign, Lupták also said: 'Slovakia can live without EU membership. The country has fertile soil and hard working hands. We do not want to import their surplus products. We will grow our own tomatoes, peppers, and red melons' (Sme, 21 September 1998). Incidentally, the ZRS was the only party in Slovakia in which a majority of its supporters reject EU membership (Gyárfášová, 1996: 289) .
Most parties of the current 10-party coalition government (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) are Euroenthusiasts. This includes three parties of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) -the Democratic Party (DS), the Democratic Union (DU), and the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) -as well as the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP). It also includes the reformed communist party of the Democratic Left (SDL'), whose Euroenthusiasm is, like that of the ČSSD or MSZP, in line with its membership of the Party of European Socialists and the Socialist International. 9 The KDH (Christian Democratic Movement), however, is a slight exception. Elected in 1998 within the SDK, the KDH stood firmly in the camp of pro-European forces in Slovak politics during the Mečiar era. It also had one of the most Europhile electorates, with 75% supporting EU membership (Gyárfášová, 1996: 289) . However, the party has always included proponents of a more cautious attitude towards the country's Western (pro-EU) orientation, out of a conservative fear of the spread of certain values and ways of life considered unsuitable for the Slovak people. After the KDH lost its more modern and liberal components to the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU), it started to perceive the EU increasingly as being dominated by left-wing liberal ideas. Consequently, it now openly expresses fears that the EU will pressure Slovakia to adopt policies such as the legalization of gay marriages. The KDH even initiated a parliamentary declaration asking for cultural and ethical policies to remain firmly within the jurisdiction of individual EU member states. The party nevertheless approves of EU membership, even though the desirability of joining is expressed mainly in economic terms. The KDH has therefore gradually adopted a Eurosceptic position.
Concluding discussion
Before we deal with the general implications of the proposed two-dimensional conceptualization of party positions on European integration, we will first summarize the discussion on East Central Europe.
Euroscepticism in East Central Europe
In Figure 2 we have classified all the parties discussed in this paper according to our conceptual model. At least four observations stand out.
First, the figure clearly shows the large number of Euroenthusiast parties, Note: Parties marked with an asterisk are difficult to classify because they hover between two types and this is confirmed by their combined electoral strength in each countryin terms of votes and even more of seats (see Table 1 ). In all ECE countries, the Euroenthusiasts polled the majority of votes in the last elections. Hence, they control the majority of seats in their respective parliaments. This indicates that there is still a large and positive elite consensus on the issue of European integration in ECE, in spite of the increased vibrancy of domestic political debates on this issue. The second striking feature is the political irrelevance of the Euroreject parties. Five of these parties (KSČM, LPR, MIÉP, Samoobrona, and SNS), at least one in each country, are currently represented in parliament on the basis of their own, individual election result. Admittedly, these parties are not entirely insignificant in any of the countries in terms of electoral support. The Euroreject vote exceeded 10% in the last elections in both the Czech and Slovak Republics, and, quite remarkably, it approached 20% in Poland. However, most Euroreject parties listed in Figure 2 are fringe parties, some with little hope of a more successful future (KDNP, SPR-RSČ, ZRS), others destined for (semi-)permanent opposition (KSČM, LPR, Samoobrona). Most importantly, in none of the four countries is a Euroreject party currently a member of the government, although two Euroreject parties (SNS and ZRS) were part of the Slovak government between 1994 and 1998.
Third, and not surprisingly, the number of parties in the Europragmatic category is small. However, both parties (FKGP and HZDS) have been in the government of their respective countries. Moreover, the HZDS polled 27% of the votes in the last elections and has since remained by far the most popular party in Slovakia. Qualitative analysis of these two parties also shows how eclectic this category of parties can be. Although both the HZDS and the FKGP are Europhobes, they accept EU membership for different reasons: the HZDS craves international recognition, hoping to improve its political position in the struggle to return to government, whereas the FKGP is unashamedly utilitarian in its cost-benefit analysis of the positive membership implications for its constituency. Finally, special attention needs to be paid to the Eurosceptic category. Eurosceptic parties exist in all four ECE countries, though their electoral support ranges from 27.7% to 2.3% of the vote. Real electoral strength is confined to the Czech Republic. However, the KDH is a junior partner in the current Slovak government. In addition, the Eurosceptic PiS is far from isolated within the Polish parliament, where it regularly links up with the Euroreject LPR and Samoobrona to criticize the Euroenthusiast SLD-PSL government.
The breakdown of the concept of Euroscepticism into two analytical dimensions contributes to the clarification of the fundamental difference between parties that are critical only of the EU, and those that are also negative about the ideas underlying the general process of European integration. Indeed, several of the more notorious Eurosceptics, such as Klaus in the Czech Republic, are actually Europhiles. Moreover, our analysis shows that some alleged Eurosceptics, such as Orbán in Hungary, are actually Euroenthusiasts, because their grievances against the EU relate not so much to the ideas underlying European integration or the EU itself, but rather to the perceived difference between the ideas of European integration and the reality of the enlargement process. In other words, they see the reality of the EU through the reality of Eastern enlargement. This is an important point. If anti-EU sentiments in ECE countries indeed reflect the exigencies of the accession process, the prospects of further erosion of the positive consensus may be high, at least until the formal accession process is completed. There is already a strong relationship between support for (opposition to) economic reform and support for (opposition to) EU membership (Henderson, 2001) . Given that in ECE countries 'election results reflect the voters' experience with economic reforms' (Fidrmuc, 2000: 199) , there may well be great opportunities for EU-pessimist (both Eurosceptic and Euroreject) political entrepreneurs who succeed in convincing the selfperceived losers from economic reforms that the EU is the main instigator of these reforms.
Moreover, there are two reasons for expecting parties to adopt a more negative stance toward the EU and, even more importantly, toward the ideas underlying the process of European integration. First, the EU is becoming more and more 'defined', which limits the possible revisions to it. Second, the EU is slowly but steadily becoming a relevant political issue in ECE politics, which has increased the available knowledge and scrutiny of it. Forced by the realities of European integration, parties such as ODS could come to the same conclusions as the UKIP, and oppose not only the direction the EU is taking but the whole process of European integration, including EU membership:
In 1975, the British people voted for the 'Common Market' in good faith. They were told it was going to be a genuine common market -an association of independent, freely trading nation states. Instead, we have the European Union: centralised, bureaucratic, unaccountable and corrupt, eroding our independence and dictating policies that we would never vote for in an election. (UKIP, 2001)
Conceptual and theoretical issues
Our analysis also carries implications for broader theoretical debates concerning explanations of Euroscepticism. A party's position on the issue of European integration can potentially be explained by various factors (see Johansson and Raunio, 2001; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001a) , but, in essence, can be brought back to the key question: strategy or ideology? Put differently, is a party's position on European integration to be changed whenever it is deemed strategically convenient, or is it grounded in the broader party ideology and thus less vulnerable to short-term political considerations? Several authors (for example, Taggart, 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001a; Sitter, 2001) argue that Euroscepticism can be explained mainly by a strategy linked to a party's position in the party system (for example, whether the party is in the mainstream or on the periphery, or whether the party is in government or in opposition). But our analysis suggests otherwise, with ideology playing the main role. We believe that the complex interrelation between ideology and strategy is directly related to the multi-layered nature of the concept of Euroscepticism, outlined in our typology. Remarkably, fundamental changes in party positions occur only in the vertical dimension of our typology. Thus, parties that are Euroenthusiast become Eurosceptic (KDH or ODS), or vice versa, but they do not move horizontally into either the Europragmatic or the Euroreject category. In other words, parties move their position on the dimension 'support for the EU', but not on the dimension 'support for European integration'. We believe that this empirical finding shows that ideology determines a party's support for the ideas underlying the process of European integration, whereas strategy can play an important role in explaining a party's support for the EU. Of course, this does not mean that parties will not move on the horizontal dimension at all. However, our contention is that such a move would imply either a wholesale ideological change or a fundamental reassessment of the whole process of European integration, as mentioned earlier. Something like that is unlikely to occur within a short period of time, and without potentially costly consequences for the party.
Our general proposition is supported by the congruence between individual party positions and membership in party families. If party ideology plays an important role in determining party positions on the dimension 'support for European integration', we would expect all parties belonging to one party family to have the same position on that dimension. This is indeed the case for all but one party family in ECE. All social democrats (ČSSD, MSZP, SDL', SLD) are Europhiles, as are all (left) liberals (DS, PO, SZDSZ, UW). All extreme right parties (LPR, MIÉP, SNS, SPR-RSČ) are Europhobes, as are all unreformed or hard-line communist parties (KSČM, ZRS). 10 All these parties also share the same position on the dimension 'support for the EU', despite the fact that, for example, MSZP in Hungary is currently in opposition.
Two interesting cases further support our contention. Consistent with the idea of the party family, all ECE conservative liberals (DU, Fidesz-MPP, MDF, ODA, ODS, US) and all Christian democrats (KDH, KDNP, KDU-ČSL) share the same position on the dimension 'support for European integration'. In other words, all these parties are Europhile. However, they do differ on the dimension 'support for the EU'. For example, the ODS is EU-pessimist, whereas all other conservative liberals are EU-optimists. In the case of the Christian democrats, the KDU-ČSL is EU-optimist, whereas the KDH and the KDNP are EU-pessimist. This may well be explained by differences in ideological positions. First of all, 'right-wing parties are more ideologically eclectic in post-communist Europe and there is a stronger tendency for the right there to be more nationalistic than its Western counterparts' (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001b) . Second, as in Western Europe, conservative liberals differ in the extent of their support for the EU, in particular on the question of how much national sovereignty is to be delegated to the EU and how much regulation is to be imposed on the market.
However, we can also argue that differences in position may be attributed to strategic considerations, most notably related to being in government or opposition (see Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001a, 2001b) . For example, in the Czech case, the ODS has sharpened its criticism of the EU since moving from government into opposition (in 1997), while the US, a split off from the ODS, has formulated its very optimistic position on the EU with frequent references to the perceived pessimism of the ODS. Similar tactical moves are observable in other parties, such as the KDNP, but always only on the vertical dimension (support for the EU). Moreover, contrary to general expectations, parties do not always harden their position while in opposition. For example, the HZDS actually softened its position after losing governmental power, and the KSČM is slowly softening as a consequence of being in permanent opposition.
Only one party family does not fit the expected positioning: the agrarians. The PSL, the FKGP, and Samoobrona are all in different categories, and are even divided along the horizontal dimension (support for European integration). However, this is less surprising than it might appear. Agrarian parties are first and foremost grouped together because of a shared constituency (farmers or the rural population) rather than on the basis of a shared ideology, which is the more usual criterion for distinguishing party families (Mair and Mudde, 1998) .
In short, there are good grounds to argue that ideology is the crucial factor in explaining the positions that political parties adopt on issues surrounding the current process of European integration. This conclusion derives from our empirical analysis of ECE parties, but is brought to the fore by our two-dimensional conceptualization of party positions on European integration. However, the typology does not just categorize different positions on European integration and the EU. It also caters for the dynamic nature of individual party positions and suggests the likely directions in which the goals and strategies of the political elites dealing with Europe will evolve.
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1 Note that Taggart's original article (1998: 5-6 ) does allude to this distinction, but the author opts for the broad definition outlined above. 2 We thank Peter Mair for pointing this analogy out to us. 3 'We are then in a world of rapid change, in which men and nations must learn to control themselves in their relations with others. This, to my mind, can only be done through institutions: and it is this need for common institutions that we have learnt in Europe since the war. . . . The need [of creating the European Community] was political as well as economic. The Europeans had to overcome the mistrust born of centuries of feuds and wars. The governments and peoples of Europe still thought in the old terms of victors and vanquished. Yet, if a basis for peace in the world was to be established, these notions had to be eliminated. Here again, one had to go beyond the nation and the conception of national interest as an end in itself' (Monnet, 1994: 18-9) . 4 'I am the first to say that on many great issues the countries of Europe should try to speak with a single voice. I want to see us work more closely on the things we can do better together than alone. Europe is stronger when we do so, whether it be in trade, defence, or in relations with the rest of the world. But working more closely together does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by appointed bureaucracy. . . . We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels' (Thatcher, 1994: 48) . 5 In our survey we include only parties that gained representation in at least one of the last two parliaments (lower houses). Thus, for the Czech Republic, we cover the parties in the period since 1996, in Hungary and Slovakia since 1994, and in Poland since 1997. For more detailed information on the party positions presented, see Kopecký and Učeň (2002) on the Czech Republic, Batory (2001 Batory ( , 2000 and Navracsics (1997) on Hungary, Millard (1999) and Szczerbiak (2001a Szczerbiak ( , 2001b on Poland, and Henderson (2001) and Kopecký and Učeň (2002) on Slovakia. 6 Unless stated otherwise, the opinion data used come from the Central European Opinion Research Group (CEORG), accessible at www.ceorgeurope.org. 7 According to a poll by the MVK polling agency, in July 2001, Slovakia's potential accession to the EU is supported by a staggering 76.6% of respondents. Though one cannot simply equate the two polls, there is little doubt that support for EU membership in Slovakia is still well above the 50% hurdle: indeed, according to the Eurobarometer survey, 66% of Slovaks would endorse EU membership. Also note that Eurobarometer indicates that 70% of Hungarians would vote 'yes' in the referendum -the highest percentage among all four ECE countries. 8 The ZChN (Christian National Alliance) is a good example of Euroscepticism related to Church-associated fundamentalism within the AWS (and the AWSP). It states: 'we do not want to be modern, European, and civilized but traditional, national, Catholic' (in Millard, 1999: 210) . At the same time, the party wants to be a part of a 'Europe of Nations', through which it wants to achieve a European re-Christianization. The ZChN nevertheless declared 'support' for Polish EU membership, but with several (absurd) conditions attached (Szczerbiak, 2001b) . 9 The newly formed Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU), of the current prime minister, Mikuláš Dzurinda, a merger of the DU and parts of the KDH, is also a Euroenthusiast party. Two other new (extra-parliamentary) parties that feature prominently in opinion polls, Smer (Direction), which split from the SDL', and the ANO (Alliance for the New Citizen), of TV Markíza owner Pavol Rusko, also take a Euroenthusiast position. 10 Note that Munkaspart (Workers' Party), the orthodox communist party in Hungary, is a Euroreject party as well (see Batory, 2000) .
